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The Trust1Connector API v3 exposes a secure REST API on the client device. Trust1Team has created a t1c.t1t.io
DNS entry (or customer-specific DNS entry) that points to 127.0.0.1
in order to facilitate SSL communication. This means that if the customer infrastructure uses a proxy for all network traffic, an exemption must be made for t1c.t1t.io
to always point to the origin device's loopback address. The same holds true for the localhost domain name, this should redirect to 127.0.0.1
on the user's local system, not the localhost of the proxy server.
If no exemption is made and https://t1c.t1t.io
is handled by a proxy, it will redirect to 127.0.0.1
IP of the proxy server instead of the local machine, and the Trust1Connector API will be unreachable.
The reserved domain from Trust1Team (t1c.t1t.io) has been registered with DNSSEC on the aforementioned URI. When a PARTNER uses its own DNS, we strongly recommend applying DNSSEC on the domain used in production.
Some (corporate) networks have a policy that disables the ability to bind a domain to a local network IP. The Trust1Connector relies on this for t1c.t1t.io
which resolves in to 127.0.0.1
which is a local ip for localhost
If DNS rebind protection is enabled it is unable to use t1c.t1t.io for connection towards the Trust1Connector because the network does not allow this Domain to be a local ip-address.
To resolve the issue either DNS rebind protection can be disabled or you can whitelist the domain t1c.t1t.io
to allow this domain.
Applications that want to make use of the Trust1Connector will be run from a specific domain. This means that the Trust1Connector needs to know that certain domains/applications want to make use of the Trust1Connector's functionality.
For these applications to gain access to the Trust1Connectors API we need to whitelist the domain in whats called the cors
list. This list contains all the accepted domains that can make use of the Trust1Connector.
In order to correctly function, the Trust1Connector API must be able to connect to its configured Distribution Service. You must allow REST traffic to the following URLs (if applicable):
Acceptance: https://acc-ds.t1t.io
Production: https://ds.t1t.io
A partner can opt for its own Distribution server, whereas the URIs mentioned above, will be defined by the hosting party.
In some cases (environments) the Domain acc-ds.t1t.io
or ds.t1t.io
are not accessable. If this is because the domain cannot be resolved we do recommend to either ask the network/system administrator to make sure that those domains can be resolved on the network. Or changing the DNS server to the google DNS (8.8.8.8 & 8.8.4.4), this has solved the issue for some of our customers.
Trust1Connector installer is about 20Mb in size. The installed size comes to 40-50Mb.
This includes the Trust1Connector API, Registry and Sandbox.
Trust1Connector installer is about 20Mb in size. The installed size comes to 40-50Mb.
This includes the Trust1Connector API, Registry and Sandbox.
The increased size over windows mainly comes to the way MacOS handles dialogs. These are distributed with the Trust1Connector as seperate binaries.
All endpoints of the Trust1Connector API are secured and require a JWT to access. To obtain a token, an API key must be exchanged.
This API key must be requested from TRUST1TEAM, or created by the customer if they are hosting their own Distribution Service. The API key must never be used in a front-end application (where the API key can be compromised). The API key is needed to exchange the token, using a Distribution Server, resulting in a short-lived Json Web Token.
A PARTNER can decide to distribute a version without the use of a JWT. In those cases, the liability of the security flow resides completely in the context of the web application, thus Trust1Team can not guarantee the security context where the Trust1Connector is integrated upon.
Trust1Connector support two operating systems for all tokens, Linux (Debian/Ubuntu) for PKCS11 tokens; On request, a Google Chromebook can be supported depending on the deployment or target installer.
MacOS 11.x or higher
X86 architecture
M1/M2/ARM architecture
Windows 810 or higher
Trust1Team support Windows/Mac OSX OS families where lifecycle support is guaranteed from the Vendor of the Operating System. The moment the OS version has been marked as ‘end of life’, Trust1Team can not guarantee the functionality anymore.
When PARTNERS are in need to support an older version or keeping the support running on the level of Trust1Team, no guarantees can be made. Trust1Team can setup a custom project, on demand of the PARTNER. Those requirements, changes or other adaptations needed, are not covered in the Trust1Connector license fee.
Windows 7
No
EOL but some partners are running a custom compiled target of the Trust1Connector in production until migration.
Windows 8.1
No
EOL but some partners are running a custom compiled target of the Trust1Connector in production until migration.
Windows 10
Yes
Windows 11
Yes
macOS 10.15 (Catalina)
No
EOL
macOS 11 (Big Sur)
No
EOL
macOS 12 (Monterey)
No
EOL
macOS 13 (Ventura)
Yes
macOS 14 (Sonoma)
Yes*
macOS 15 (Sequoia)
Yes
2023-10
macOS 14 (Sonoma) has issues at the moment with usblib and CCID. A future patch will fix the card reader issues; Updates will be come avaible when a patch is released
To run in user-space on Windows 8.1 or higher some components have to be set on the operating system
Below you can find a list of all registry keys that will be created for the working of the Trust1Connector, All these keys are added to HKCU
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Trust1Team\Trust1Connector
Since 3.5.x no more cookies are used.
The Trust1Connector is browser agnostic so it does not matter what browser is being used as long as it support HTTP communication (HTTP 1.1) (which should all of them).
Version wise we do recommend to use the latest versions of your browser for security reasons but the versions below is was we accept as a minimum
Chrome >80
Firefox >75
Edge 88 or higher
IE 11 (End of Life is June 15 2022)
All other browsers. As recent as possible
You can find the trust1connector JS SDK for the Trust1Connector v3 via NPM
You can also find the source code here https://github.com/Trust1Team/t1c-sdk-js/tags
The different architectures supported by the Trust1Connector
The Trust1Connector can be configured to comply with different installation scenario’s. This can be done when packaging the Trust1Connector, and is managed through setting the correct command-line arguments upon startup. To facilitate this, the Trust1Connector ships with a partner specific launcher which can be adapted to comply with different reqeusts.
The Trust1Connector can be installed in different ways, depending on the requirements for a specific business context. By default the Trust1Connector uses the best approach for a device in an unknown context.
The different setups describes below all share *the same codebase*. For each target the executables are exactly the same.
We achieve this through command line parametrization of the executable. Updating the CLI parameters for the API or Registry modifies the behaviour of the runtime execution.
This provides us with the following benefits:
same code base, same binaries
change behaviour for a specific context
change behaviour at runtime
The installation profiles, as we tend to have many command line arguments, are encapsulated in a separate executable, this is called 't1c-launch'.
The 't1c-launc' does the following:
validate the environment
validate prerequisites
start the connector executables
provide the correct CLI params, decided upon compilation time
provide an CLI param override mechanism, which is a pass-through for the overriden params to the executables (api/reg/sandbox)
This document describes all achievable different scenario’s with pros and cons, depending on the business case.
To understand how the Trust1Connector can be setup, it is good to have an overview of all components in the Trust1Connector eco system.
Component
Description
Note
T1C-SDK-JS
An easy to use Javascript SDK for quick integration into partner web applications
This is an optional component which can be used to ease and speed up the integration of the Trust1Connector into any web application. The SDK acts as an interface for the consuming web application and supports backwards compatibility
REST Client
A 3rd Party Rest client
Any REST client can be used to address the Trust1Connector use cases directly from your consuming application. Applications can be native desktop applications or web applications in any technology
T1C-Sandbox
A secured Sandbox for smart card APDU execution, exposing a gRPC interface
The Sandbox can be used directly for certain applications, but it’s main goal is to isolate the APDU interactions towards smart cards, and card readers (contact or contactless)
T1C-Rust-API
An OpenAPI REST interface, acting as an addressable microservice.
The local REST Service, installed on the local device, serving the functionality used directly from consuming applications or from the T1C-SDK-JS. The OpenAPI YAML is published and can be used to generate a REST client in any technology
T1C-Registry [Decentralised]
An optional Local Registry for multi-host or shared environments.
It is required when using Trust1Connector on a shared machine with multiple users. The component is optional, and a central registry can be used as well. The integrating party must choose whether to opt for a local dynamic registry or a central Distribution Service Registry
T1C-Registry [Centralised]
An optional Centralised Registry for multi-host or shared environments. The service can only be used when a Distribution Service is provided in the solution architecture.
It is required when using Trust1Connector on a shared machine with multiple users. The component is optional, and a local dynamic registry can be used as well. The integration party must choose whether to opt for a decentralised or centralised approach. When choosing a centralised approach, a Distribution Service setup is needed.
T1C-DS
The Trust1Connector Distribution Server is a central management service for the T1C.
The DS is serving use cases for version management, demographic information, key rotation, additional security protection, dynamic CORS, application management and more
Virtual Reader
The remote loading implementation for a backend smart card service
The virtual card reader acts as a remote smart card reader, able to communicate with any card on a remote client enabling HSMs (High security modules), central card management systems, smart card personalisation use cases and more
API Gateway
An optional API gateway introduced when using the T1C-DS for security policy enforcement
As the T1C-DS acts as a REST microservice, additional security measurement must be taken into account. The API gateway implements different security policies applied on:
Device to DS communication
Application to DS communication
The Trust1Connector can be installed in ‘offline’ mode. This is the case when:
no internet connection is available
no centralised Distribution Service is available/wanted
Following this approach, the installation base (devices with T1C installed) is managed from an software application distribution platform (version management, insights, …).
The Trust1Connector is fully functional in an offline environment and contains all module logic in the installation footprint. The options explained here describes what are the possible modes for offline installations.
Trusted browser and no PIN encryption between the browser and the connector application interface.
Untrusted browser and PIN encryption enforced through the connector application interface.
The Shared Registry executable is introduced to resolve client address ports during initialization. The shared registry runs a single instance on one of the connected clients OR the host application.
When the host is NOT running the shared registry, clients are dynamically checking if a registry is available. When a registry instance is not found, a random client launches a registry instance, untill the client becomes unavailable.
In this mode the Distribution Service is used for one or both of the following categories of use cases:
connector client instance synchronization
central port resolution
The former category denotes the device synchronization and management operational use cases.
The lattter adds to the functionality by acting as a central registry, becoming a critical component during connector client instance initialization.
In that scenario, connector instances are always bound to DS (Distribution Service); the DS is the centralized service handling the address port resolution for every client. A client will register it’s dynamically assigned port (from a configurable port range) at the DS. The DS resolves the address port for each web application trying to connect with it’s local client. The handshake is performed using an the web application consent flow.
The DS is a central service collection all anonimized operation data for every linked connector instance.
The DS serves the operational use cases:
demographic information
SSL and Device certificate rotation
client-demand log dispatching
CORS management
application application management
The communication from the web application towards the connector instance is secured and requires pre-requested JWT from the Distribution Service.
The local connector instances enforces JWT validation prior to use case execution.
Additional functionality for device key-rotation and application registry bindings are available in this context.
In this mode, DS communication is established but not blocking operationally once installed.
PIN Encryption and shared registry is configured on the host or on the client dynamically (local election algorithm). The shared registry stores a list of agents, keeping track of agents-port correlation.
The JWT authentication/validation on API is optional and configured during packaging.
An extension on the profile above, is when an admin runs the 'registry' process on-startup, as a service user, in a shared environment. This means that the registry process will run always, and will not be changed throughout user sessions (especially when a user session gets invalidated, or stays acive even when de user has logged out.
For shared environments, our recommendation is to start the registry process on a shared environment for all remote terminals/clients.
The DS keeps track of the client address ports and resolves the port upon every new session between the browser and the local connector instance during initialisation. Additionally the public key for web application encryption is shared between the registry and the requestion client application.
The variants decribed hereafter differs in how the packager stores the files and executables during installation.
In this mode, a user image is by default stateless and the connector is initialized upon every new user session.
This implies that the connector instance will register upon startup, for every new user login.
The user always starts with a clean installation when logged-in. This approach resembles with how Docker starts new images instances and can be used thus in a Docker image.
This variant is called ‘split installer’ and splits the location of the executables during installation and the user session related configuration files (transaction info, consent, device certificates, logs, …).
In this approach, the executables are provision in a predefined path (typically system program files or system folder).
The user session related files are stored in a user specific folder location.
Trust1Connector v3 Documentation
The Trust1Connector Javascript SDK is a library that functions as a proxy towards the Trust1Connector API. This Library does not contain any business logic and is a refernce implementation for the Trust1Connector API (HTTP/JSON).
Sample code uses ES6 language features such as arrow functions and promises. For compatibility with IE11, code written with these features must be either transpiled using tools like Babel
or refactored accordingly using callbacks which are also available on the Trust1Connector Javascript SDK.
The Trust1Connector is a middleware which interacts with hardware tokens and system certificate stores (where certificates are stored and protected within the operating system).
The ambitions of the Trust1Connector is to:
provide a generic interface to hardware tokens and smart cards
operating system agnostic (works for all operating systems)
browser agnostic (not depending on a browser plugin)
facilitate the onboarding and identity dematrialization
facilitate the derivation towards a mobile identity
favours a decentralized approach and privacy-first
facilitate user authentication and digital signatures
facilitates identity information validation and secured transport
favours a Zero-Knowledge approach
exchange Verifiable Claims
How the Trust1Connector solves the DNS rebind issue
DNS Rebind automatic resolution is implemented starting from v3.8.4, older version can solve this by following the troubleshooting guide:
The connector is using a DNS (depending on the connector partner), with a default value of:
The given URL is registered with DNSSEC enabled, and resolves to a 'localhost' domain.
Although the connector can run in a different mode (http, localhost, custom domain name, etc.), to solve the above issue, the following causes are probable:
DNS Rebind is enforced from your router or ISP (Internet Service Provider)
The domain name is not whitelisted in your internal network
A local proxy is running and prevents the internal connector communication
An antivirus is blocking the connector communication
Your (custom) DNS server does not contain resolution for localhost and t1c.t1t.io
The functionality for automatic DNS Rebind resolutation solves the local connectivity issue by adding the DNS used by the connector to the host file of the device.
As the connector is running in user-mode, and thus not have elevated rights, a separate process will be started on the operating system, asking the user to enter the `admin password` only with the purpose of adding the record to the host file of the system.
When a user does not have `administrator` access to his device, and IT administrator can solve the issue (an apply it to all users from that domain).
The following diagram show the logic begin the one-time check. The process runs on startup on a seperate system thread, and when executed succesfully, persists a marker file (.dnsrebind) in the installation directory of the connector.
Starting from from a clean installation, it will go trough the flow above and based on the outcome of the DNS resolving, the process will update the hostfile and create the markerfile
The process will go trough the flow above and when successful, a DNS check is executed which a successful response.
The process will go trough the flow above and when successful, the process will create the marker file without the need of updating the hostfile
The process will go trough the flow above and when `failure`, the process will see the marker file, resulting in a error message that it could not resolve the domain. In this scenario, the markerfile indicates that the hostfile has been updated so the problem must be elsewhere.
The process will go trough the flow above and when `failure`, the process will create the marker file and update the hostfile. When the final DNS check fails and it will return an error message.
Here the markerfile also indicates that the hostfile has been updated so the problem must be elsewhere.
Running the Trust1Connector in a shared environment, such as Citrix, XenApp and Remote Desktop, requires additional installation steps. In this section we explain the concept and approach used.
The following schematic seems rather complicated as it explains the inner workings of the Trust1Connector components, the concept is explained further on this page. If you are only interested in what the integration impact is for your Web Application in a Shared Environment, you can skip and go directly to the following section:
The Web Application can use the T1C-SDK-JS or a custom REST API client for integration purpose. As the Web Application operates in a browser context, resolving an agent, by means of a consent, will result in a browser cookie being provided.
The T1C-SDK-JS implements the detection of a Shared Environment during the initialisation of the library. When initialisation succeeds without a controlled exception, the setup is a standalone; when the initialisation throws an 401 Error, the T1C-SDK-JS can be used to request the user for a Consent.
When using the REST API directly form your web application, reading the browser cookie and performing the initialisation must be done by the integrating Web Application itself.
Compared to Trust1Connector v2, the v3 release has a separate component to be be installed on a shared host. This component is called the T1C-Registry
and only exposes the following use cases:
Verify random available ports [in a predefined range] which can be used by an Agent (Session of T1C-API running in user space)
Port reservation upon installation of a new T1C-API in an active user session
Port registration upon initialisation of a T1C-API in an active user session
Management of an in-memory list of active Agents
Management of user consents in a shared environment by means of browser cookies with an optional configurable TTL (time to live)
The T1C-Registry
operates by Default on the API port defined in the T1C-DS
(Distribution Server). From a Web Application perspective, this is the only information known. When a Web Application requests the information of the device, the PROXY device type will inform the Web Application that the targeted underlying API is a PROXY, which means that the Web Application must ask for the Agent specific API port to configure an URI which can be used to execute the use cases.
When using the T1C-SDK-JS
this is done implicitly during initialisation.
A T1C-API
installed for a specific users runs in [User Space]. To avoid possible attack vectors, the Trust1Connector v3 will always run in [User Space].
Upon installation of the T1C-API
, during the post install phase, the T1C-API
will try to verify automatically if it is running in a shared environment. If this is the case, the T1C-API
will ask the T1C-Registry
for available ports and will reserve those post, prior to initialisation and startup.
The ports which are reserved by the T1C-Registry
are the following:
T1C-API
Port: This is the port exposing the OpenAPI interface towards Web Applications and used by the T1C-SDK-JS
When receiving ports during post-install, an user agent device is temporary RESERVED
in the Agent Registry of the T1C-Registry
. Upon T1C-API initialisation, the port configurations will be confirmed and the Agent Registry will set the device state on REGISTERED
. From this moment on, a T1C-API instance, running in an active user session, will be available for the Web Application via the .
The T1C-sandbox
instance is inherently a component from the T1C-API
, and thus is managed by the T1C-API
. As each user must have it's own hardened runtime for communication purpose, the port assigned for T1C-sandbox
will be registered and configured by the T1C-API
(and restarted when needed).
Starting from this release (v3) of the Trust1Connector, each device must have a link with an active and running T1C-DS
(Trust1Connector Distribution Server). This is to guarantee security, updates, and avoid potential risk in production.
The T1C-DS
is proceeded by an API Gateway who is managing the security offloading in the application layer. For a Web Application to communicate with a T1C-Registry
or T1C-API
, a JWT (Json Web Token) is needed and obliged. The T1C-DS
is responsible for the key management, the certificate management and other use cases which are described in a separate wiki.
In order to retrieve a valid JWT, the T1C-DS
can be requested from your application back-end with a valid api-key. The JWT is valid for a given amount of time, and sets the context used when requesting the T1C-API
on a device.
The PIN handling logic is implemented in the Trust1Connector API. More information on the basic and/or advanced rules can be found on the following link:
The API and Registry use a feature called Mutexes to have data that can be shared over multiple OS threads. Using this is necessary for some functionality. In previous versions when you have a Shared environment (citrix for example) you could make the API and Registry get into what's called a DeadlockThis caused the Mutex to never be unlocked for use by another OS thread. Causing the connector to be blocked completely.This has now been solved and has been tested on instances of 1000 concurrent devices.
We had a user which Operating system had a custom date set (not synced) which caused issues with DS communication. The DS communication also checks wether the time of request is not in the future or in the past (with some slack ofcourse). So if you use the Connector with a custom date you will not be able to contact the DS because it requires a request within a correct time-zone.If this is not the case it could be that a malicious user is trying to exploit the DS at which point the DS refuses the request. The issue was that this caused the Connector to crash.This has been solved so that the Connector does not crash.System time must be correct, otherwise DS communication can not be done (secrity issue)
Private Network Access is a new CORS draft. Which prevents remote servers to contact local instances without any extra checks. Chrome has already implemented this draft in a non-blocking manner, the implemenation of chrome is to send 2 pre-flight requests. One which is the normal pre-flight and another one where the PNA implementation has been done.At this point the pre-flight for the PNA implementation is non-blocking meaning that if the pre-flight fails it will not block the request.When the PNA Cors draft is final this will become blocking.In this release we've already started adding some required components to support this in an upcoming release.
In this release we've implemented a feature where the Connector will send it's log files towards the DS. This is so that support desks can easily get the log files of the device which is requesting support.
We've added a feature where you can run the Connector in regualr HTTP mode. To still be secure we've added a signature field to the responses which can be verified to not be tampered with at the client's side. This verification is implemented in the JS SDK.
Javascript SDK 3.6.0 has been unpublished and contains a bug in the consent flow where the error code is not returned correctly
The Mac Silicon (M1) is not yet supported for this version
The consent error code has been updated in the Trust1Connector API library, and t1c-sdk-js clients have no impact on that change
When using different instances of the Trust1Connector (optionally from another partner) on a Windows system, a port collision could be possible due to a race condition in port assignment upon initialization. Ports are now protected with anti-collision and are salted to make a port less guessable.
When no LaunchAgents folder was present on the system, the installation procedure creates this folder implicitly.
Camerfima is a new PKCS11 token added to the modules of the Trust1Connector. The Camerfirma token pre-requisites the installation of the Carmerfirma middleware.
Chambersign is a new PKCS11 token added to the modules of the Trust1Connector. The Chambersign token pre-requisites the installation of the Chambersign middleware.
The token info endpoint has been implemented before only for identity tokens. We have added support for Token Info of the PKCS11 modules. As the response has a different data structure, an additional type has been added for clients to parse the response correctly.
The PKCS11 token info exposes information on the algorithms which can be used for different use cases (digital signature, validation, authentication, ...). In a future release additional functionality will be provided such as: encryption, decryption, key exchange,...
For the different notification types, many tokens share multiple certificates for a single type. The original interface supported only a single certificate response. To be backwards compatible, those certification function have been adapted to be behave the same as in v3.5.x.
New functions are available to support multiple certificate reponses, they are called: [certificateType]Extended. For PKCS11 tokens the certificate response also returns, besides the base64 encoded certificate and the certificate id, the following properties:
issuer
subject
serial number
hash sub pub key
hash iss pub key
exponent (payment modules)
remainder (payment modules)
parsed certificate (ASN1 format of the base64 encoded certificate)
You can find an example for
A new function has been added for all PKCS11 modules called the 'validate' endpoint. This endpoint, when available, can be used to validate a signed hash received after calling the 'sign' function. In an next version a variant of the validation function using OpenSSL will be added for all tokens.
For the Trust1Connector to support more PKCS11 functionality, the intermediate PKCS11 layer has been removed in preference of a direct PKCS11 LIB integration. FFI is used in RUST to support any library which need to be loaded.
Additional guard has been implemented to prevent empty algorithms for the digital signature and validation endpoints. PKCS11 tokens will verify as well if the provided algortihm is exposed as an allowed mechanism for the targetted use case.
The Trust1Connector can now detec Java Card Object Platform 3 typed cards
When requesting for a signature or an authentication, the correct certificate must be provided. For PKCS11 tokens the certificate id (or reference) can be ommitted. The PKCS11 token will be default pick the first certificate (for the type needed) and use this with the specified mechanism to sign/authenticate.
flowchart LR
AA((Start)) --> A
A[Check connectivity] --> B{Is connected?}
B -->|yes| D((END))
B -->|no| F{Marker exists?}
F -->|yes| G[Check connectivity]
F -->|no| H{Host file updated?}
H -->|yes| G[Check connectivity]
H -->|no| J[Append domain to hostfile]
J --> K{Marker exists?}
K -->|no| M[Create marker]
M --> G[Check connectivity]
K -->|yes| G[Check connectivity]
G --> O{Is connected?}
O -->|yes| P[End]
O -->|no| Q[Error message]
Q --> P((END))
The Trust1Connector
core services address communication functionality with local devices. The Trust1Connector
core exposes 2 main interfaces:
interface for web/native applications using JavaScrip/Typescript
REST API as a new approach and to incorporate the Trust1Connector
as a microservice in the application architecture
In this guide, we target only the use of Trust1Connector's
core interface for web/native applications.
The T1C-SDK-JS
exposes protected resources for administration and consumer usage.
The JavaScript library must be initialized correctly in order to access the all resource.
Consumer resources are typically used from an application perspective:
Get pub-key certificate
Get version
Get Information (operating system, runtime, user context, variable configuration)
List card-readers (with active card)
Get card-reader
List card-readers (with active cards)
List card-readers (with or without active card)
Trigger a push of the log files towards the DS
Executing these functionality is explained further.
The Trust1Connector functionalities are about secured communication
with device hardware.
The document highlights communication with smart card readers - contact and contact-less. Other hardware devices can be enabled or integrated as well in the solution. Some of the already are, for example printer drivers, signature tablet drivers, ...
After you've initialized the Trust1Connector you can execute the rest of the Trust1Connector's functionality, for example listing the readers and fetching information from a specific smart card.
Returns a list of available card readers. Multiple readers can be connected. Each reader is identified by a unique reader_id
.
T1CSdk.T1CClient.initialize(config).then(res => {
var coreService = res.core();
core.readers(callback);
}, err => {
console.error(err);
});)
The response will contains a list of card readers:
{
"success": true,
"data": [
{
"id": "57a3e2e71c48cee9",
"name": "Bit4id miniLector",
"pinpad": false,
"card": {
"atr": "3B9813400AA503010101AD1311",
"description": [
"Belgium Electronic ID card (eID)"
],
"module": "beid"
}
}
]
}
When multiple readers are attached to a device, the response will show all connected card readers:
{
"data": [
{
"id": "ec3109c84ee9eeb5",
"name": "Identiv uTrust 4701 F Dual Interface Reader(2)",
"pinpad": false
},
{
"card": {
"atr": "3B9813400AA503010101AD1311",
"description": [
"Belgium Electronic ID card"
]
},
"id": "57a3e2e71c48cee9",
"name": "Bit4id miniLector",
"pinpad": false
},
{
"id": "c8d31f8fed44d952",
"name": "Identiv uTrust 4701 F Dual Interface Reader(1)",
"pinpad": false
}
],
"success": true
}
Important to notice:
The response adds a card
-element when a card is inserted into the card reader.
The response contains card-reader pin-pad
capabilities
As mentioned in the List card-readers
, when a smart-card is inserted/detected, the reader will contain the cart-type based on the ATR. The ATR (Anwser To Reset), is the response from any smart-card when powered, and defines the card type.
The Trust1Connector
recognized more than 3k smart-card types.
{
"data": [
{
"card": {
"atr": "3B9813400AA503010101AD1311",
"description": [
"Belgium Electronic ID card"
]
},
"id": "57a3e2e71c48cee9",
"name": "Bit4id miniLector",
"pinpad": false
}
],
"success": true
}
Possibility to exclude certain readers based on their name
This exclude readers will search for the term in the reader names and exclude those that match with the term
core.readersExcludeByName("Bit4id", callback);
{
"data": [
],
"success": true
}
As mentioned in the List card-readers
, when a card-reader has pin-pad capabilities, this will be mentioned in the response (notice the pinpad
property):
{
"data": [
{
"card": {
"atr": "3B9813400AA503010101AD1311",
"description": [
"Belgium Electronic ID card"
]
},
"id": "57a3e2e71c48cee9",
"name": "Bit4id miniLector",
"pinpad": false
}
],
"success": true
}
The following example is the response for List card-readers
on a device with 4 different card-readers attached:
{
"data": [
{
"id": "ec3109c84ee9eeb5",
"name": "Identiv uTrust 4701 F Dual Interface Reader(2)",
"pinpad": false
},
{
"card": {
"atr": "3B67000000000000009000",
"description": [
"MisterCash & Proton card",
"VISA Card (emitted by Bank Card Company - Belgium)"
]
},
"id": "e5863fcc71478871",
"name": "Gemalto Ezio Shield Secure Channel",
"pinpad": true
},
{
"card": {
"atr": "3B9813400AA503010101AD1311",
"description": [
"Belgium Electronic ID card"
]
},
"id": "57a3e2e71c48cee9",
"name": "Bit4id miniLector",
"pinpad": false
},
{
"id": "c8d31f8fed44d952",
"name": "Identiv uTrust 4701 F Dual Interface Reader(1)",
"pinpad": false
}
],
"success": true
}
In the above example you notice that 4 card-readers are connected. Each card-reader receives his temporary id
which can be used for other functions where a card-reader id is needed.
This method can be requested in order to list all available card-readers, and optional cards-inserted.
Each card-reader has a vendor provided name, which is retrieved from the card-reader itself.
An additional property pinpad
, a boolean
value, denotes if the card-reader has pin-pad capabilities. A pin-pad is a card-reader, most of the times with its own display and key-pad.
From a security perspective, it's considered best practice to use as much as possible pin-pad capabilities of a pin-pad card-reader.
When a reader has a smart-card inserted (contact interface) or detected (contactless interface), the card type will be resolved by the GCL in order to respond with a meaningful type.
In the above examples you see that; one card-reader has a Belgian eID card; another card-reader has a MisterCash
or VISA Card
available for interaction.
The readers returned, are the card-readers with a card available. The card-readers where no card is presented, are ignored.
Returns a list of available card readers with a smart card inserted. Multiple readers can be connected with multiple smart cards inserted. Each reader is identified by a unique reader_id
and contains information about a connected smart card. A smart card is of a certain type. The Trust1Connector
detects the type of the smart card and returns this information in the JSON response.
T1CClient.initialize(config).then(client => {
var coreService = client.core();
core.readersCardAvailable(callback);
}, err => {
console.error(err);
});
Response:
{
"data": [
{
"card": {
"atr": "3B9813400AA503010101AD1311",
"description": []
},
"id": "57a3e2e71c48cee9",
"name": "Bit4id miniLector",
"pinpad": false
}
],
"success": true
}
To retrieve the version of the Javascript SDK you can use the version
function available in the CoreService
You can follow the example below to retrieve the version number
T1CSdk.T1CClient.initialize(config).then(client => {
var coreService = client.core();
core.version().then(version => {
console.log(version)
});
}, err => {
console.error(err);
});
The ouput in the log of the code above should look like the following
3.5.3
via the getDevicePublicKey endpoint you're able to fetch the public key information of the device. This requires an authenticated client to be able to access this endpoint.
This endpoint is used in the library to encrypt pin, puk and pace information so that it is not exposed in the network logs of the browser.
Encryption of pin, puk and pace is only possible when the Trust1Connector is registered via a DS and has a valid device key-pair. The SDK will automatically switch to send the pin, puk or pace info in clear text if its not able to encrypt. The Trust1Connector API will also detect if it has no valid device key-pair it will not try to decrypt the incoming pin, puk or pace information.
Via the pushLogs
function you can trigger the Trust1Connector to send out the log files towards the Distribution service.
export interface AbstractCore {
getImplicitConsent(codeWord: string, durationInDays?: number, callback?: (error?: T1CLibException, data?: T1CClient) => void): Promise<T1CClient>;
validateConsent(consent: string, callback?: (error?: T1CLibException, data?: T1CClient) => void): Promise<T1CClient>;
updateJWT(jwt: string, callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data?: T1CClient) => void): Promise<T1CClient>
info(callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data: InfoResponse) => void): void | Promise<InfoResponse>;
reader(reader_id: string, callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data: SingleReaderResponse) => void): Promise<SingleReaderResponse>;
readers(callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data: CardReadersResponse) => void): Promise<CardReadersResponse>;
readersCardAvailable(callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data: CardReadersResponse) => void): Promise<CardReadersResponse>;
readersExcludedByName(name: string, callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data: CardReadersResponse) => void): Promise<CardReadersResponse>;
readersCardsUnavailable(callback?: (error: T1CLibException, data: CardReadersResponse) => void): Promise<CardReadersResponse>;
getUrl(): string;
getDevicePublicKey(): void;
dsCorsSync(): Promise<boolean>;
pushLogs(): Promise<boolean>;
version(): Promise<string>;
}